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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is the result of several years interest
in the question of abortion.

Heretofore, I have written

letters to the editor of a newspaper, to the editor of
MacLean's, and to the Chairman of the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Health and Welfare in its study of
Bills C-122, C-123, and C-I36, which were concerned with
To write a thesis on the sub-

contraception and abortion.

ject is my chance to come to a broader understanding of the
problem.

From my readings, I have found these outstanding

features:
1.

Discrepancies in abortion statistics:-

The

discrepancies are to be found in the statistics of illegal
and usually hidden abortions and in legal abortions.
Actually, there can never be an accurate record of
illegal abortions and one can hardly expect this to be kept,
simply because of their clandestine nature. Estimates may
vary tremendously, and one hardly knows whether they include
spontaneous miscarriages as well as induced abortions. Somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 abortions in Canada per
year has been recorded.

One could safely guess that at

MacLean's June, 1963 edition. Letter to the Standing
Committee on Health and Welfare is published in the Minutes,
p. 632. See next footnote for details of the Committee.
1

least 40,000 are accomplished per year because that is the
figure that the Dominion Bureau of Statistics has for the
number of in-patients whose primary diagnosis is abortion.
But that number will include spontaneous miscarriages as well
as illegally induced abortions. Indeed, while fifty per cent
of illegal abortions reported in police files are usually done
by the injection into the womb of some septic fluid, very few
of those 40,000 hospital cases in the D.B.S. file have septic
causes associated with them.

If the number of illegal abor-

tions Is in the range of tens of thousands, most are not re2
suiting in hospital care.
Therapeutic or legal abortions have been recorded in
some hospitals, but under the pre-1969 law the records were
never accumulated for federal statistics.

Hence, we are in

a quandry as to the number of legal hospital abortions previous to 1969.

In terms relative to the 40,000 in-patients,

they must be small; the Toronto General Hospital, the second
largest hospital in Canada, averaged only 22 per year between
1954 and I965.2

With the new law, every hospital planning to

perform abortions must be accredited or approved and statistics will be kept for examination of the minister of health
in each province, and from these accurate statistics can be
acquired for all of Canada.
2
Canada, Parliament, Commons, Standing Committee on
Health and Welfare, Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36.
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, House of Commons, 27th
Parliament, 2nd sess., 1967- p. 19, 100,000 to 300,000 abortions; p. 515, 40,000 hospital in-patients.
3

Ibid., p. 279.
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2.

The diversity of theological opinion:-

It is

rather strange to see the great diversity of opinion among
Christian theologians on abortion.

They can agree that

modern genetics and embryology point to human growth as a
smoothly developing process from conception, not a pattern
with sharply defined stages. But they cannot agree on the
beginning of its humanity.

Nor can they agree on any other

basis by which to consider abortion.

Abortion has received

a concerted examination by theologians and other professionals
only once in recent years, at the International Conference on
Abortion, held in Washington in 1967. And, at that Conference,
only this amount of agreement was achieved:
God is the creator of man and the author of life; man is
created in the image of God; man is the steward of life
and not its complete master. By inculcating an inclusive
love of mankind, by teaching that life is the gift of
God's providence, religion fosters a reverence for life
and a respect for its sacredness which encourage at least
an attitude of hesitancy toward the act of abortion.4
3.

A meagre amount of theological study on abortion:-

In the books and journals that I read on abortion, theological
presentations were never lengthy.

I read no book by an aca-

demic theologian that dealt exclusively with abortion; there
was no thorough study by any theologian.

The world awaits

its first theological tomb on abortion.
4.

The dearth of counselling help for women with un-

wanted pregnancies:-

Churches and secular institutions have

^The Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation, The Terrible
Choice: The Abortion Dilemma (New York: Bantam Books
Inc., 1963), pp. 83-84.
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little to offer the woman anxious about her pregnancy.

There

are homes for unwed mothers, but these are of no use to married
women, and they receive the girls usually only after their
third month of pregnancy, at a time when the girls have outlived their crisis and have decided whether to seek abortion
or to carry on with the pregnancy.

Since 1963, however, the

situation has improved, with the establishment of "Birthright,"
a crisis counselling centre for women with unwanted pregnancies.
With Birthright, help is as near as the telephone, and its
success in Toronto has led to its recent expansion in Montreal
and Edmonton, and in some cities in the United States.
These four impressions stand out among many.

The

reader will note how negative they are; how, indeed, they
point to the urgent need for study and action with regard to
this serious problem.
This paper attempts to answer the main question of the
public debate:
tion?

What should constitute legal grounds for abor-

It is the central issue raised by the mass media and

the central problem of the House of Commons Committee on
Health and Welfare in its 1967-1963 hearings.

Legal grounds,

of course, concern legislatures and judges. Nevertheless,
they have theological implications, namely, the value of the
fetus and the right to abort it.
of Christian teaching.

They deserve the attention

To this end I shall begin the dis-

cussion with attitudes and arguments that are prevalent in
the public context.

Then I shall work on the problem from

5
a specifically Christian theological context and try to suggest a law that is theologically sound, and, hopefully,
legally tenable.
Before I begin, however, I would suggest that the
central practical issue about abortion is not the grounds
for making it legal but the means for reducing unwanted
pregnancies.

And while many may disagree with there being

any law, few, if any, would say unwanted pregnancies are a
good thing.

The law will determine the conditions for legal

abortions, it may affect the number of illegal abortions and
the total number of abortions (e.g. a strict law will reduce
legal and illegal abortions if positive factors like respect
for fetal life and counselling agencies for women with unwanted pregnancies are available, too); but social and
economic conditions and religious attitudes will play a
greater role in determining the rate of unwanted pregnancies
and abortions.

From a Christian viewpoint, the best law will

be that which reflects God's will regarding the value of the
fetus and the right to abort it.

Having done this, it will

suggest guidelines that lead us closer to God's will in the
abortion dilemma.
My sources for the essay come from various books and
journals, newspaper clippings, the 336 pages of Minutes and
Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Health and Welfare in its 1967-63 deliberations on abortion,
as well as some conversations with persons at St. Monica House,
a home for unwed mothers in Kitchener, and associations with
Birthright.

CHAPTER

I

ATTITUDES IN TRANSITION
With respect to abortion, the psychological mood of
the mass media has changed a great deal in the past ten
years.

Much more is being said openly.

Newspapers report

abortion procedures in foreign countries, especially in
Britain and in the United States.

Sweden used to be con-

sidered avante garde a few years ago because of its abortion
laws, but with the heavy caseload of abortion-seekers under
the 1967 British abortion law, it looks rather conservative
today.

Yet British statistics may soon decrease, at least

in North American visitors, once New York, Hawaii, and Maryland start to practice their recently revised statutes and
pregnant women avail themselves of abortion as they please,
as long as the doctors are willing to perform the operation.
We have seen in the newspapers articles about fee-splitting
between American and British doctors.

The American doctors

send their patients to the British doctors who perform the
operations, and then return them back to the American doctors
for

post-operation check-ups. We have read about "grand

tours" for women who wish to combine a holiday trip in
Europe after their abortion in England; and stories of London
cabbies picking up girls at the airport and delivering them
to abortion clinics.

Pictures and stories about such girls
6
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show little ugliness about the operation or discharge from
the clinic.

The girls are often surprised that the venture

was so easy.
grubbing.

The ugliness seems to come in the money-

Guilt and suffering are born within.

Ten years ago, abortion reformers had to face the rejection of the public.
innocent babes.

They were murder-lovers, butchers of

Today, the sophisticated liberal speaks

nonchalantly about the need for total repeal, and few persons
react.

It is interesting to note that while the Globe and

Mail has been publishing an average of two items a week on
abortion in the past two years, that there have been only a
4

few letters to the editor about abortion.

The issue is,

apparently, of little concern to most of its readers.
Magazines have taken polls of readers to get their
reactions to the abortion debate.

In Photo-Journal, a Quebec-

based popular magazine, presumably with a majority of
Catholic readers, a poll was held at the time of the House of
Commons debates on abortion reform (Fall, 1967).

At the same

time, Good Housekeeping, an American-supported magazine with
a reading public of various religious backgrounds held a similar poll.

The two surveys compared closely on grounds for

abortion except in the cases of the mother being unmarried
or the family situation (income, etc.) being unsuitable for
another child.

In both cases

the Quebec (Catholic?) maga-

zine showed a much more liberal attitude.

3
Photo
Journal

Good
Housekeeping

Mother's health threatened

30.2$

34.1$

Unborn child's health
threatened

73.3

73.5

Unmarried mother

56.4

15.5

Rape or incest

32.2

35.9

Unsuitable time

50.3

14.6

Though Good Housekeeping is most likely a married
woman's magazine, the indication of married women only in
the Photo-Journal was still 52.3$ for abortion if the mother
was unmarried, and 43.3$ if the tim'e was unsuitable.

Per-

haps we should not be surprised at this liberal attitude of
Quebec "Catholic" women.

Abortion is quite popular in South

America too, where the population is predominantly "Catholic."
And, Maryland, a traditionally Catholic state, is the second
state in the United States to repeal abortion laws.
On March 9, 1970, the Toronto Daily Star newspaper
published a Gallop Poll on the following question:
Would you favour or oppose a law which would permit
a woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any
time during the first three months?
U.S.
Favour
Opposed
Undecided

1

Canada

40$
50$
10$

43$
43$
9$

100$

100$

Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36, pp. 764-772.
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Canadians (and Americans) seem to be slightly more
against abortion on demand than they are for it. But,
according to the same article, earlier Gallup Polls had
shown a strong favour (73$) of Canadians towards abortion
when the health of the mother is in danger.
If, as the Gallup Poll indicates, Canadian and
American attitudes to abortion are very similar, then perhaps the reasons behind the attitudes are similar.

At any

rate, Ralph B. Potter, Jr., has made some interesting observations of the American Protestant change in attitude
toward abortion and I would suggest that they tell us a
good deal about the attitudes of Canadian Protestants:
The main elements of the abortion issue are not new;
zeal for abortion reform is not new; most of the arguments are not new. It is the receptivity of a broad
segment of the "Protestant" public that is new.
There are three factors LI could only see two from
his writing] to this new receptivity.
(a) A breakdown in old theological certainties about
nature, God, and Man which sustained the conviction that
nascent life in the womb is, in every circumstance, a
gift from God given for the realization of mysterious
purpose, and is, therefore, to be respected as inviolable
from lawful human interference except in the tragic case
in which the life of the fetus is pitted against the life
of its mother. . . . Protestants have feared not an
"abuse of nature" [as have Roman Catholics] but rather a
direct affront to "nature's" God. When a new habit of
mind now attributes new life to rotten luck in the practice of contraception rather than to purposeful will of
a merciful God, neglect of the countermeasure of abortion becomes irrational and superstitious retreat from
the possibility of exercising control of one's destiny.
Denial of accessibility to abortion comes to be seen by
many as a violation of civic liberty.
(b) There is a dimming of the vision of a Protestant
American made to conform to the dictates of Protestant
conscience. . . . By devotion to their own principles,
i.e. self-determination and the rational control of
nature, Protestants are obliged to tolerate a gap between

10
what is morally condemned and what is legally prescribed.
Protestants are confused concerning the moral status of
abortion when practiced by Christians. Their confusion
is compounded by uncertainty regarding the extent to
which the moral judgements of one segment of society should
be imposed upon others by legal enactment. The unpleasant aftertaste of Prohibition [of alcohol] lingers on.
More and more Protestants aquiesce to the moto You can't
legislate morality."2
To this analysis, I would like to make one adjustment
--the fact that Prohibition was never practiced in Canada;
and one addition--the growth of contextual or "situation"
ethics.
2
Ralph B. Potter, Jr., "The Abortion Debate," in
The Religious Situation, ed. by Donald R. Cutler (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 114-116.

CHAPTER

II

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GROUNDS FOR ABORTION
A.

Subjective Feeling
Let us begin with positions that are held by

Christians and non-Christians, positions that do not necessarily reflect any religion.

At the extreme "right" of the

spectrum are those who assert the inalienable right to life
of the fetus. Roman Catholics have expressed this, but so
has a militant atheist I know.

At the far "left" there is

the position that abortions should b'e on demand; a position
that secular humanists often hold and a position held by some
Christian theologians (e.g., Joseph Fletcher:
unintended baby should ever be born").

"No unwanted or

And between the far

right and the far left are opinions of all shades held by
devout Christians and non-religionists alike. Why are persons
of divergent religious beliefs able to agree on this matter,
while vehemently disagreeing with some who share their religious attitudes?

The answer, I think, lies in the fundamental

inner feeling we have when we compare human life as an entity
of value, with the usefulness of human life as an entity of
value.

The answer is conditioned by the weight we put on

human life when compared with human suffering.

I suspect

that these attitudes are usually based on subjective feeling.
Though we may argue with theological statements and make our
Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics
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arguments sound as though we are looking to the Bible, etc.,
as the source, the ultimate source may not be the Bible or
any other theological source, but our subjective feeling. I
suspect that much of the theological wrangling is caused by
persons who start from a "gut" feeling and try to build
arguments from theology to support this.

If so, it is only

natural that atheists and theists who have the same subjective feeling will agree with one another.
B.

The Humanity of the Fetus
The humanity of the fetus is the most controversial

aspect of abortion.

If one believe-s that the fetus is

actually human, then one is inclined to be hesitant in
aborting it.

Other things being equal, those who hold that

the fetus is human from the time of conception have the
2
highest regard of all for the fetus.
On the other hand, if one thinks of the fetus as less
than human, one is going to be less concerned with the fetus
being preserved and allowed to grow. Why should it have human
rights if it is not human?

Maybe there are instances in which

the life of the fetus may rightly be aborted; instances in
which values higher than its life are allowed primacy.

The

next question is, what is more valuable than that life, even
though it is not human?

This is the dilemma of those who

2
Popular Roman Catholic acceptance of abortion as mentioned on page 3 suggests the authority crisis in the Catholic
Church and the greater taboo against contraception by the
Church.
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would abort the fetus.
Is, then, the fetus human or not?
fetus is incipient human life.

Biologically, the

From conception it has the

genetic formation it will have if allowed to grow^to maturity.
It is not a piece of tissue that has grown from the mother's
womb.

It is a genetic package sui generis formed by 23

chromosomes of the father and 23 chromosomes of the mother
and its relationship to the mother is one of apposition.
Apposition does not imply the right of possession but only the
right of first consideration regarding the fetus's effect on
her body.

Being so directly affected by the presence of the

fetus, however, we should expect to do everything in our
power to help her when the fetus is the cause of her distress.
The trouble is that doctors can rid her of the fetus only by
killing it in the process, unless, of course, the fetus has
reached the age of "viability," or 26 weeks, at which time it
may be able to survive outside the womb.

Here again, there

is still much difficulty because of the baby's vulnerability
to disease and premature feeding abilities. If we we^e to
choose a time best suited for the mother's health, we would
choose some time before the end of the third month to perform
an abortion, when the baby would have no chance of survival.
Though knowledge of embryology points to the fetus as
incipient human growth, neither medicine nor any other scientific discipline can conclusively explain the point at which the
fetus becomes or is fully human.

They can say that the fetus is
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not a horse or some other animal because its genetic package
is human only.

It is "human" in the sense that it is not

some other living creature.

Other than that, they, and

persons of any other discipline are left fumbling for some
definition to suit the purposes of their discipline. Theologians might define it as being fully human when it is the
"image of God," but God alone knows that with certitude.

The

Criminal Code defines it for the purposes of law in Section
195:
A child becomes a human being within the meaning of the
Criminal Code when it has completely proceeded in a
living state from the body of its mother and whether or
not it has breathed or has independent circulation or
the navel string has been severed.
So far, we have no universal definition for that pointin human fetal life where we call the fetus a fully human being.
Even if we could find one, there still must be agreement as to
whether or not the right of the fetus to life is equal to its
mother's right once the fetus has reached that point. Most
persons assume that if the fetus- is human then it should be
allowed the same rights as the mother, an equal opportunity
to life.

Others do not hold to this view because they do not

equate the right to life with being human.

They suggest that

it is not the least common denominator (being human) that is
the ultimate criterion for equal opportunity, but the difference in quality of life.

These are not necessarily utilitarian

qualities, such as value to the rest of the family; they can be
inherent qualities such as maturity and intelligence.

And bo

those who would hold this position, the risk of health or
position to the person (the mother) with these higher
qualities is sometimes not worth preserving the life of
the person (the fetus) with only the lower qualities of
existence.
There is still another argument that the antiabortionist might use:

though the fetus cannot be proven

to be fully human, the fact that it is incipient human life
should be ranked higher than any qualitative differences.
This argument is strengthened by the fact that all postnatal life is given the right to life even though there are
great differences in quality:

some persons are like mere

vegetables, while others are highly intelligent, etc.

In

answer to this argument an abortionist could reply that we
must not just think of human life in terms of physical
existence.

The human qualities are cultural, non-animal,

spiritual or aesthetic elements which go beyond mere
existence, and in a case of conflict the barely human fetus
should be aborted to prevent the thwarting of the highest
qualities in the mother and others who may be affected.
They explain that the reason mongoloid idiots, etc., are not
killed or allowed to die is because they are never in a conflict of interest with other humans of such magnitude as an
unwanted fetus might be.

They may also argue that physical

death is not to be abhorred so much as spiritual or psychic
death or crippling.

The termination of relatively insensate
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embryonic life is sad, but the mother and family may be burdened economically; if unwed, the mother's career might be interrupted and her parents might be vindictive and unforgiving.
In answer to this, the conserver of fetal life may
reply, "But the suffering of mother and others can be healed
in time, while the death of the fetus means that it has no
further chance."

But the objecter might respond, "Maybe the

suffering will not be healed.

Maybe the unwanted pregnancy

is 'the straw that breaks the camel's back' and there is no
recovery.

Relationships could even get worse."

The point is that one cannot solve the abortion
problem by proving the fetus to be human or not human.

Being

convinced that the fetus should be kept alive and allowed to
grow, and being convinced that fetal life is expendible in
certain circumstances, are two axiomatic propositions.
C.

Ultimate Claim on the Fetus
Another way of looking at the value of the fetus is

not in terms of its humanity, but in terms of its value to
other persons or God and asking who has ultimate claim upon
it.

All theologians would say that God has ultimate claim

upon it. Some would say that though the fetus is not one of
the creatures of the air, sea, or ground over which God gave
him jurisdiction in Genesis 1:26-30, he does not warrant the
same protection of life as does his mother.

From this posi-

tion they might argue that God's authority has been delegated
to man to the point that the value the fetus has to the mother
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or to the father or to society is sufficient for man to decide
concerning abortion in terms related to them.

At any rate,

by so arguing, they do so with the same point in view as the
person who does not look to God for ultimate authority but
uses these criteria as bases of judgement.
D.

Who Suffers the Most?
Another important factor is one we have already touched

on but have not discussed--the suffering involved.

If the

suffering the fetus undergoes could be measured on a scale
and compared with the suffering of the mother, etc., this
might be used by some as a criterion.

The one who would suffer

the most would perhaps have preeminent rights. Unfortunately,
we cannot measure the suffering on either side. We can imagine
the suffering of the mother, father, etc., but find it very
difficult to imagine the suffering of the fetus because of unknown factors like pain in its nervous system.

I raise this

"suffering" issue because I think that our imagination of the
degree of suffering on both sides plays a large part in the
feelings we have about abortion.

Gynacologists generally dis-

like performing abortions perhaps because they think of the
woman on the operating table as a clinical subject, but the
fetus as a tiny human whose life they are to destroy.

Those

who do not perform the operation imagine the suffering from
the strain and anxiety from the face and words of the mother,
and the possible feelings of the fetus who they never see. I
have sometimes gotten the impression from those who ask for
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abortion on demand that women are unable to tolerate an unwanted pregnancy without frightful consequences.

This view

can be readily reinforced by conversations with some women
carrying a child they do not want.

For example, I inter-

viewed nine girls at St. Monica House, the home for unwed
girls in Kitchener.

All but two of them had seriously con-

templated abortion, and two nearly went through with it
illegally.

Some of the seven that had contemplated abortion

were glad they had not, and the rest still wished that they
had.

Some were finding their pregnancies and the thought of

having to bear an unwanted child distasteful enough that if
they had the chance again they would seek an abortion. Moreover, they felt it should be available upon demand.

This

latter group felt that their suffering was not worth the
life of the fetus.
The "suffering" issue enters into the legal picture
directly.

The circumstances usually defined are: danger to

the life of themselves (the mother); danger to her health, or
certain aspects of her health such as physical, mental, social
or economic.

Other legal indications are statutory rape (when

the girl is under age), incest, and fetal abnormalities. There
may not be any suffering on the part of the girl or woman with
statutory rape or incest, but if there is it could easily fall
under the category of danger to her health.

Fetal abnormal-

ities do not affect the woman's health directly, but indirectly impose a burden upon her and the family.

Some

19
argue that abortion of the abnormal fetus is doing the unborn
child a favour, and this is an argument for a kind of mercy
killing.
I shall discuss these legal considerations in detail.

CHAPTER

III

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ABORTION
A. Danger to the Mother's Life
This is sometimes qualified by such a phrase as
"likely to endanger" or "there is a grave risk" since
every pregnancy has the possibility of endangering the
life of the mother.

What is implied by these phrases is

the doctor's judgement that ;if the fetus is not removed
the mother will probably die.

If the law of the land

allows that only this circumstance makes abortion justifiable, it assumes that the value of the fetus is higher
than anything else save the physical life of the mother.
B. Danger to the Health of the Mother
In the Canadian and Japanese laws on abortion,
"health" is stated with no qualification.

In the Japanese

situation "health" has been given such an interpretation
that it has led to near abortion on demand.

In 1966, for

instance, there were 1,360,000 live births in Japan and a
total of 303,216 abortions legally registered, of which
305,075 were for the "protection of the mother's health."
So far, the Canadian law has interpreted narrowly.

Accord-

ing to Dr. George Maughan, chief gynacologist and obstetri1

Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 371.
20

cian at Montreal's Royal Victoria Hospital, physicians and
surgeons remain conservative about abortion, but psychiatrists
have adopted a much more liberal attitude.

It is the gyna-

cologist who must perform the operation, he points out,
2
almost to his extreme distaste.
Given willing doctors,
however, the number of abortions depends upon the sensitivities of the abortion committee of three or more doctors
at each hospital, and upon the persuasive powers of those
recommending the abortions to the committee.

In Victoria

Hospital, London, Ontario, the number of therapeutic abortions have been 135 in 1969, 50 in 1968, and 26 in 1967-3
I have learned from my own doctor that he would have no
trouble whatever getting an abortion done at this hospital.
The World Health Organization defines "health" as:
a state of complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease.4
This definition is obviously a goal to reach, not a minimum
standard.

But if this was ever interpreted as the norm by

which health should be judged, "health" could be used as
the reason for abortion on demand.

There is every reason

to assume that on some abortion committees in Canada this
2
George Maughan, "Survey Indicates Rise in Hospital
Abortions," Kitchener-Waterloo Record, (March 13, 1970),
p. 27.
^Martin Robinson, "Doctors Are Chided for Lack of
Support of Birth Control," Kitchener-Waterloo Record
(March 26, 1970), p. 42.
^Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 403.
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interpretation will be approximated, provided, of course, that
there are hospital beds to accommodate the women.
I could speak in detail about each of the aspects of
health—physical, mental, social and economic.

For the sake

of this theological paper, I shall speak only briefly.
1.

Physical
Danger to physical health usually refers to such

factors as fatigue and wear upon the mother, because of a
pregnancy occurring too soon after the birth of a child,
the hardship of pregnancy itself, extra burdens at home,
physical problems like weak kidneys and heart, and general
weakness.

If the threat to physical health is sufficient it

may reach the point of threat to her physical life.

The

degree of strain bearable is a medical judgement.
2.

Mental
Danger to mental health, or psychiatric stress is the

most commonly used indication for abortion in Canada.

Threats

of suicide and postpartum psychosis are typical indications.
Depressions of various degrees are sufficient indication for
abortion in the minds of some psychiatrists.

Mild depression

as an indication implies abortion on demand.

Obviously, it

is very

difficult to assess the amount of mental stress a

given woman could manage.

And these psychiatric indications

are made more difficult by the possibility of mental conditions that may follow abortion and which sometimes do not
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show themselves for years afterwards.

At the present time

the Canadian Psychiatric Association is conducting a five
year study to gain further understanding about the problem.
3.

Social
Social health is the well-being of the mother in soci

relationships—with her parents, husband or boy friend, other
children, and society as a whole.

If the girl is unmarried

or if the pregnancy results from adultery, the fear of social
stigma may be worse or as bad as the actual condemnation that
she and her husband/boy friend will have to put up with.

In

Japan, pregnancies out of wedlock are totally intolerable.
Here in Canada, forgiveness and adoption of the baby are
often possible.

In many Canadian homes, however, social

stigma would cause a great deal of stress and from real or
imagined pressure many girls would seek abortion. Actually,
social health can be understood as a form of mental health
and may sometimes be included under that category.
4.

Economic
Economic health is the financial well-being of the

home in which the baby is to be reared.

Poverty and large

families often go hand-in-hand, not just because of the lack
of contraception, but because of economic irresponsibility
or hopelessness.

Sociologist, Arturo Chacon, former General

Secretary of the Methodist Church in Chile, recently told a
group of United Church clergymen that the birth rate in

South America would drop dramatically if the standard of
living was raised for the urban and rural impoverished
masses of that continent.

Contraception is not the first

answer for the South American masses. It will be used only
as the poor see hope for a rise in living standards. The
same could be said of the Indian and Metis poor in Canada.
Certainly, one's views on abortion must be related to social
indications for it.

Until the social circumstances are

improved abortions will always be widely sought.
5.

Ethical
Ethical grounds for abortion fall under the category

of "health of the mother," because they relate to the stress
on the mother from criminal assault.

Forced rape, however,

is the only true assault on the mother.

Statutory rape is

fornication under age which is assumed to have been done by
consent.

Incest is also fornication by consent (otherwise

the charge would be forced rape).

It is interesting to find

that adultery, another social crime, is rarely suggested as
a possible ground for abortion.

The reason, I suspect, is

that the advocators of abortion for ethical reasons consider
the matter in relation to whether or not the mother "deserves
the pregnancy.

In the case of rape and incest, there is a

general feeling of pity and a demand for social redress. In
the case of adultery, there is a greater feeling of righteous
indignation—"She deserves what she got." Mrs. Louise
Summerhill, the director of Birthright, a crisis centre for
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women with unwanted pregnancies, tells me that the most difficult situations Birthright has to deal with are those resulting from adultery.

The guilt and lack of forgiveness in

this situation seem to be the most distressing.
C.

Eugenic Indications
These are not for the sake of the mother or family

primarily, bint a type of mercy-killing to prevent unnecessary suffering of the baby after birth.

The mother and

family would be spared the trouble of looking after it or of
giving it up to some retarded children's home, or the like.
Having it aborted also prevents the trouble of society providing for it for the rest of its life.

The severely subnormal

child is looked upon as a human cripple, and by many as subhuman, hardly able to feel or act in any human way and sometimes less sophisticatedly than a primitive animal. In subsistent and primitive societies the severely subnormal child
would in all likelihood be abandoned to die just as the subnormal animal would be left to die by its parents. Were food
scarce enough in our society, no doubt such "useless" creatures would be allowed to die too.
Until very recently the detection of fetal abnormalities
has been impossible.
statistics.

Predictions were made on the basis of

Now we have medical procedures such as amniocentesis,

whereby a hollow needle is inserted into the amniotic sac and
amniotic fluid is withdrawn.

Cells of the fetus found in the

fluid can be analyzed so that diseases like RH incompatibil-
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ity, hemophilia, and Mongoloid Idiocy can be determined.
Radiography can be used to tell harmful placement of the
placenta, and electrocardiography can be used to tell fetal
heart problems. Direct observation, then, is taking over from
statistical guessing.5

Furthermore, RH incompatibility can

now be prevented by intrauterine blood transfusions; and
ruebella, a common fetal disease, may soon be prevented by
vaccine.
If abortion was legally permitted for eugenic situations, medicine might be dulled in its efforts to find
further medical solutions and aids for the handicapped.
Furthermore, there is no clear line of demarcation between
who is or is not useless or undesirably incompetent, and on
the grounds of even slight distortions, young lives could be
destroyed.
D.

Over-Population
A growing number of people favour abortion as a

means of reducing over-population.

The present Moderator

of the United Church of Canada, Robert McLure, M.D., has
performed many abortions on women in India and recommends
it as a population reducer.

It is not nearly as effective

as raising the standards of living, as Arturo Chacon of
Chile (page 23), and economist Lady Barbara Ward have suggested.

Lady Ward suggests that the reason poor families are

Charles P. Kindregan, The Quality of Life (Milwaukee:
The Bruce Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 34-35-
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so large in India is because poor farmers need as many sons
as possible to look after them in their old age.

Abortion

as birth control is medically hazardous. In the Soviet bloc
countries abortion has been legally permitted on a wide
basis, but the medical hazards of abortion such as premature
births in future pregnancies, miscarriages, and perforations
of the uterus have been grave enough that two countries,
Rumania and Bulgaria, have rescinded the permissive laws and
made new ones that restrict abortion to threats to the life
of the mother (Rumania), or pregnancy after three or more
children, or old age.'
It is interesting to note that not all countries
suffer from exploding population.
population.

Some suffer from under-

Between the two World Wars, France regressed

in population for reasons other than artificial birth control
and Abortion.

In Sweden, population was so small that it was

not until 1939 that abortion was allowed to be legalized.
This ends our discussion of atheological indications
for abortion.

As we shall see, and have seen in part already,

they are not irrelevant to the thinking of clergymen and
theologians.

In reality, theologians are forced to consider

them carefully if they are to make ethical judgements which
have useful bearing on actual human situations.
Data from a television programme.

7
C. Tietze and Sarah Lewit, "Abortion,"
American, CCXX (January, 1969).

Scientific

CHAPTER IV
A SURVEY OF CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO ABORTION
A. The Right and the Left
Theological arguments on abortion, like political
views, can be divided into right and left positions. Starting with the far right, we find those who believe that
abortion is morally indefensible.

From there the scale of

permissible circumstances moves to threat to the life of the
mother, serious threat to her physipal health, serious threat
to her mental health; then into general physical health, mental
health, social health or socioeconomic welfare. Ethical and
eugenic reasons may come in anywhere after the threat to the
life of the mother.

Those who favour abortion as birth

control ("on demand") represent the far left. Akin to this
spectrum of morality is division of opinion regarding the legal
right to make abortion laws.

Usually associated with the

rightist moral position is the belief that it is the proper
function of the state to intervene in the matter of abortion
and make laws to prevent harm to the mother, family, medical
profession, and society at large.

Those who tend toward

abortion on demand would usually prefer safeguards only for
the medical health of the mother.

They may ask the question:

"What reason can justify the refusal of the state to grant permission for an abortion?" or the more radical question, "Why
23
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should there be any law?" The right to legislate on abortion
is a bigger issue in the United States than in Canada because
of the attempt to separate Church and State by the Constitution of the United States.

In Canada there is no legal de-

finition of the moral and spiritual powers in terms :of law.
The problem in the United States is compounded by the fact
that abortion laws come under state rather than federal
jurisdiction.
Ralph B. Potter, Jr., describes the right and left
wing moral positions in the United States:
The rub of the right-wing argument is simple and stark:
the condoning of widespread abortion would undermine
civilization. The argument is couched in theological
terms; it leads, however, to conclusions in the realm
of cultural anthropology. There are many distractive
bypaths along the route to be traversed in argument. But
the constant goal is to convince hearers by whatever arguments carry force in their generation, that the practice of abortion is incompatible with the attainment of
man's true humanity.
The profundity of the right-wing argument is its
greatest weakness. Many of the injuries described by
controversialists on the right take place in a dimension
of existence unknown or unexplained by their fellow
citizens. Indeed, when the particular "harms" are
analyzed closely, they are seen to consist ultimately
of a deprivation of a greater good, a good which may
transcend the concern of a secular, pluralistic state.
Can the prevention of such harm, or the realization of
such a good, be considered a valid legislative purpose
sufficient to overrrule the strong desires of innumerable pregnant women? . . . (p. 123)
Leftists emphasize the high incidence of criminal
abortion. Rightists emphasize statistics to diminish
the danger gap between hospital and extra-hospital
abortions, (p. 124)
Leftists say right wing propaganda encourages guilt in
women over abortion. Rightists say psychiatrists don't
pick up a lot of the inner anxiety on this. (p. 126)
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Leftists would remove the cultural inducement to exhibit
the learned response of guilt. Rightists insist that to
get rid of guilt you must avoid the occasion for guilt.
Absence of guilt in this case is a sign of callousness
and spiritual sclerosis, (p. 126)
Rightists claim that abortion frustrates the realization of man's true humanity, though the evidence for
this is hard to find. The central claim of the right
wing is that abortion is evil because it deprives
the mother of the greater good of becoming a mother.
[I find this hard to believe and have found no evidence elsewhere of such a claim.] (p. 127)
Is the rejection of abortion rooted in the nature of
man or does it derive from a response to the image of
man portrayed in the Gospels? The issue cannot be
settled by available anthropological data which seem
to indicate a general ambivalence towards abortion within societies which differ greatly in the rate of occurance and the severity of sanctions imposed, (pp. 129-130)
The right wing must indicate a harm the law cannot ignore
to a victim the law is bound to protect. . . . To defend
public laws against abortion the Christian needs legal
arguments derived from the universal norms of natural
justice, (pp. 131-132)
Man's worth is not to be assessed according to what he
has become through social intercourse or by an estimate
of what he may yet become. Rather it is God's labor,
his purpose, his economy, which places the price of life
so high that no transient human value can serve as compensation. But with the erosion of the theological
foundations of the Christian view of man's alien dignity
[i.e., dignity from outside], the barriers to abortion
built on those foundations are crumbling in the hearts
of individuals and the statutes of the states, (p. 150)1
Distinguishing between right and left wings is largely
a matter of emphasis.

To the rightist, the value of the fetus

has preeminent right over the other or others who may suffer
from the unwanted pregnancy.

To the leftist, the suffering

Ralph B. Potter, Jr., Abortion Debate, pp. 23-50.
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of the mother, family, etc., has preeminent right over the
value of the fetus.

Each side views the law for its purposes.

The strict law helps the rightist.

A permissive law or no

law at all helps the leftist.
Answering the question, "Who has ultimate claim
upon the fetus?" is the way that many theologians evaluate
the worth of the fetus vis-a-vis the suffering of others.
Let us look at the answers given to this question from church
denominations and from individual theologians.
B.

Who has Ultimate Claim upon the Fetus?
No Christian would deny that God has ultimate claim

upon the fetus, just as He has ultimate claim upon nature
and the rest of humanity.

As our Creator, as the Alpha and

Omega of all that is, He has the last and foremost say. Nor
would many—I know of none--say that the fetus is of the
order of the swimming, crawling, and flying things over which
man is to have dominion (Genesis I ) .

Thus, if man has control

over the life of the f,etus, it is in a relationship something
akin to the relationship that he has to his fellow man—as a
brother and neighbour.

How close this "something" is, I have

never heard defined, but as we shall see,it becomes the focus
of the whole debate.

The question is more than "Am I my

brother's keeper?"; it is also, "How far is the fetus whom
God has made to become a human my brother?" Is it possible
that God does not assume direct responsibility
to himself alone?

of the fetus

Is it possible that he delegates some of
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his authority and the right to live or let'live upon man, upon
for example, no man but the fetus himself, or upon the mother,
or upon the father, or upon society as a whole?
1.

Denominational Positions
(a)

and God:-

The Fetus is Under Claim to No One But Himself

This is the answer of all those who claim the

inalienable right of the fetus to live.

The fetus has in-

trinsic worth and this prevents any one from claiming right
over his life in terms of some other person or value.

He is

to be treated with the same fundamental rights given a born
human being.

As stated earlier, people of various religious

views may hold this position, but it is held mainly by the
Roman Catholic Church.

It is a position of natural law,

i.e. the fetus has the natural right to be allowed to live.
The right is not handed to him for merit or position.
it simply because he is incipient human life.

He has

Pope Pius XII

explains it this way:
Innocent human life, in whatever condition it is found,
is to be secure from the very first moment of its existence from any direct deliberate attack. This is a
fundamental right of the human person, which is of
general value in the Christian concept of life; and
hence as valid for the still hidden life within the
womb of the mother as for the life of the already born
and developing outside her. . . . Whatever foundation
there may be for the distinction between these various
phases of the development of life that is born, or still
unborn, in profane and ecclesiastical law, and as regards
certain civil and penal consequences, all these cases involve a grave and unlawful attack upon the inviolability
of human life.2
"Abortion,"
29.

The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1962, I,
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Notice the inseparateness of the four factors—human
life, the intention of nature, fetal life, the right to live.
There is no ambiguity or question about their direct relationship with one another.
It is interesting also how ironclad is the Catholic
interpretation of the sin of abortion.

It is a sin under

canon law only if it results from all of the following
factors:

if it is intended, i.e. not an accident; if it

happens from the deliberate use of means, i.e. not indirectly; if the means are efficacious, i.e. the fetus dies.
There is a great deal of confidence shown here in man's
4

ability to estimate what is and what is not sin; or what is
the most important part of sin; and the ability to summarize
and rank it in terms of propositions or statements. The
danger is that casuistry, the skill of interpreting conscience, becomes the focal point here--not the fetus, not the
mother, not medicine, not the social and economic and spiritual evils behind the suffering.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Catholic
position is the belief that the right to life is jiot something for humanity to bestow upon the fetus, in law, or out
of it, but something that is inherent in the "nature" of things.
This separates the Catholics from those who say that God bestows the right directly, and from those who say that the
state should be the ultimate judge in the matter.^
3

Ibid., p. 30.

See Appendix I for the factors involved in the traditional theological elements.
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(b) The Fetus's Right to Life is Delegated to the
Father:-

There is only one clear reference to abortion

in the Bible:

Exodus 21:22-25:

When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child,
so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows,
the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the
woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as
the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you
shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot . . . stripe for stripe.
This passage is part of a larger passage concerned
with acts of violence--Exodus 21:12-27. We see in this
larger passage that parents are ranked higher than children
(verse 17) and freemen higher than slaves (verse 21). Is
4

it any wonder, then, that the fetus is given less regard than
his mother, as seen in the quotation above?

However, it is

the value that the fetus has to the father that ultimately
counts.

For in the case of "no harm done" (the mother does

not suffer) the husband gets the money, and in the case of
the death of the mother, the husband receives recompense
again.

In effect, both the mother and fetus are the prop-

erty of the husband and justice is done with the husband in
mind.
In Islamic law, the fetus is regarded as a possible
heir who can have his own heirs, but abortion is performed
only with the father's consent.->

In modern times, the

father, as final arbiter in the matter, is not accepted by
c

Martin J. Buss, "The Beginning of Human Life as an
Ethical Problem," The Journal of Religion, XLVII (July,
1967), 246.
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either Christians or Jews.

The Jews, however, have made

this Exodus passage their proof text and most Jewish theologians regard the fetus's right to life incontestable
except on the grounds of threat to the mother's life or
health.
(c)

The Fetus's Right to Life is Determined by

Strain on the Mother:-

This is the most popular position of

moderate and leftist Christian theologians and Churches. Among
Protestant Canadian denominations we can see a gradual shift
from relatively conservative or rightist positions to fairly
liberal or leftist positions as we move from the Presbyterian
to the Anglican to the United Churches.
The Presbyterians recommend abortion "where the
mother's physical and mental health are seriously threatened."'

The Anglicans recommend abortion on the same grounds,

i.e., where the pregnancy involves a "serious threat to the
life or health of the expectant mother."

The United

Church of Canada officially recommends abortion "when continuance of pregnancy is likely to endanger the mother's
life or seriously impair her physical or mental health,"
but the committee which presented this as part of a brief
to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health and
David Granfield, The Abortion Decision (Garden City:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 47-497

Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 392.
3
Ibid., p. 475-
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Welfare gave a more liberal view.

One of the members, the

Rev. J. Raymond Hord, presented a paper in which he said
that the fetus was of accruing value."

Two other members

interpreted this to mean value accruing to the mother.
In other words, the more the fetus meant to the mother, the
more did its value increase.

None of the United Church com-

mittee disagreed with this interpretation.
2.

Individual Theologians
(a)

and God:view.

The Fetus is Under Claim to No One But Himself

Roman Catholic theologians usually hold to this

Since Vatican II, however, more are speaking of moral

questions being in the last analysis a question of conscience.
If the mother believes that abortion is the moral thing for
her, then she may regretfully seek an abortion.

Richard A.

McCormick, S.J., suggests that the fusion of the soul does
not take place at conception, "but rather at some later point,
perhaps when the body develops recognizeable human characteristics.

"The Catholic Church," he points out, "has never

settled the theoretical question definitely; indeed, it is
perhaps

questionable if this is in her realm of competence."

Father R. F. Drinan disagrees, because in the absence of certainty the presumption must be that the fetus is a human person and because, even if the presumption is false the embryo
9
10

Ibid., p. 623.

Ibid., pp. 603, 610.
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"constitutes the necessary material for the infusion of the
soul." 11

The Canadian Catholic bishops never referred to the

infusion of soul theory in their statements to the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, but assumed
the modern biological explanation of fetal development; i.e.
a "continuing process in the child from the moment of concep12
tion to adult age."
(b) The Fetus's Right to Life is Delegated to the
Father:-

To my knowledge, no theologian has interpreted

the right of the fetus to live primarily on its meaning to
the father.
(c)

The Fetus's Right to Life is Determined by

Strain on the Mother:-

Ronald M. Green holds to the posi-

tion of the late 19th Century philosopher W. D. Ross, that
morality should be based on prima facie duty to that which
one has promised.

In pregnancy there is not "an absolute

but a prima facie duty to respect the life of the fetus."
Such a duty would constitute a moral claim that could
be outweighed by more pressing obligations like the
life of the mother, her health, eugenic reasons and
rape. . . . Here the locus of ethical concern is not
upon obligation to the life of the fetus but rather
upon the act of faith-keeping or promise-keeping
occasioned by the sexual act. . . . Whenever a woman
willingly engages in coitus she, in doing so, makes
an implicit promise that in the event of conception
she will bear and give life to the fruit of her act
Kennedy, The Terrible Choice, p. 36.
12

Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 325. Andre
Naud, Professor of Theology, University of Montreal.

even if she has used contraception. . . . This puts the
decision primarily on the mother, not on society as a
whole, because promise to life is the issue, not life.
Society should only require that the woman seek psychiatric help and advice.13
I question this as a Christian position.

It makes

the life of the fetus a matter of paternalism (maternalism?)
instead of value on its own—a very degrading position for
the fetus.

Nevertheless, in an age when honour and duty and

responsibility for one's actions are being heeded less and
less, it is a good reminder of responsibility to those who
just want to "do their own thing" whatever the consequences.
Another theologian who is of this category is Martin
J. Buss, Professor of Theology at the Chicago School of
Divinity. ^

Buss believes that humanity is a stage reached

in the development of the embryo that can be discerned by
characteristics that are peculiarily human.
characteristics of language.

These are the

Language is the conditio sine

qua non for humanity and the means by which the Word of God
is transmitted to man.

It is God's addressing the growing

life that makes it valuable as a person, nothing intrinsic
to itself or to any other person or value.

But until the

life has reached the stage where it can understand the language of man, it cannot understand the revelation of God.

God

-^Ronald M. Green, "Abortion and Promise-Keeping,"
Christianity and Crisis, XXVII (May 15, 1967), portions
from pp. 109-112.
^"The description on page
of the thesis is a summary of Dr. Buss's presentation. Buss, "Beginning of Human
Life as an Ethical Problem," pp. 244-253.

speaks his Word through persons and tradition.

The fetus

cannot understand Him and is therefore less than human and
less important than other humans who may be suffering because of him.

Some have pointed out that God cannot address

the child in the womb and they may point to Jeremiah l:4f
which declares that Jeremiah was "known" while still in the
womb.

But Buss is arguing that there is a dividing line

between the human or language-understanding child and the
prehuman.

Though God could address Jeremiah as a prehuman,

the image of God "can properly represent in man only that
selfhood and mastery of its environment which makes him
relate to and share in divine creativity" which begins at
least at the cultural stage of life where man responds to
man in meaningful language.
Having established the beginnings of real humanity,
Buss implies that any prehuman life can be aborted as a
J
means of birth control.IS
If questioned on the grounds
for abortion he might restrict himself more than he does,
but one gets the impression that he holds little concern
for prenatal life.
It would seem that the option of voluntary abortion
is indicated by a genuine fusion of faith, creative
reason, and love. . . . It is in line with biblical
tradition not only because of the Bible's eloquent
silence on the subject but even moreso because of the
Judeo-Christian concern for personal relationships
with deity and one's fellow man, which go beyond personal passivity and simple biological existence.1°
15
l6

Ibid., p. 252.

Ibid., p. 253-
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I see two flaws in his arguments:

his identification of the

"image" of God as a stage at least as advanced as the ability
to respond culturally; and secondly, his attempt to demonstrate the unimportance of prenatal life.

The "image" of God

does not necessarily begin at any particular stage past conception.

Since child baptism is often performed before the

child understands language and yet child baptism implies
God's prevenient grace, why use cultural or language development as the beginning of the image of God in man?

As for the

worth of the fetus, I fail to see God having a radical difference in concern for the fetus in comparison with that he
would have for the person who is culturally aware.
(d)

God Delegates His Authority to No One. He

Assumes it Directly:-

There are several theologians who

look to God alone as the authority.

They assume that the

fetus is given by God and that he is human in God's sight
and that he must be granted the same right to live as his
mother.

Thus, the only possible reason for abortion would

be that case where the life of the mother was in jeopardy
because of the fetus within her, and there was no likely
way of saving her without aborting the fetus. In such a
case, two equal lives in the sight of God must be given as
good a chance as possible.

If the fetus were under the age

of viability, then the choice would be to save the mother.
If, on the other hand, the fetus were of the age of viability,
then the choice would involve other factors.

This approach
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is taken by Karl Barth, Helmut Thielicke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Paul Ramsey and Graham Scott.
In his Church Dogmatics III, 4, Barth explains his
position on abortion:
He who destroys germinating life kills a man and thus
ventures the monstrous thing of decreeing concerning
the life and death of a fellow man whose life Is given
by God and therefore, like his own, belongs to Him.
He desires to discharge a divine office, or, even if
not, he accepts responsibility for such discharge by
daring to have the last word on at least the temporal
form of the life of his fellow-man. . . . This child
is a man for whose life the Son of God has died, for
whose unavoidable past in the guilt of all humanity and
future individual guilt He has already paid the price.
(p. 416)
How can they [the parents] will the opposite [the death
of the fetus]? They can do so only on the presupposition
of their own blindness to life, in bondage to the opinion
that they must live rather than they may live, and therefore out of anxiety, i.e. out of gracelessness and therefore godlessness. (p. 420)
Human life is not something enforced but permitted;
i.e., it is freedom and grace, (p. 413)
In his grace God can will to preserve the life which
He has given', and in His grace He can will to take it
again. Either way, it is not lost before Him. Men
cannot exercise the same sovereignty in relation to
it. . . . Trained in the freedom which derives from
the grace of God, they can choose and will only one
thing—they can desire only its life and healthy
birth. . . . In the sense of a guiding line the one
exception is the balance of one life against the
other. . . .[in which case] the calculation and venture must take place before God and in responsibility
to Him. (p. 422)17
Up to this point, Barth has been adamant in his restrictions.

In his small print, however, he mentions an ex-

'Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 4 (Edinborough:
T. and T. Clark Publishers, 1961).
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ception which, in my mind, has a withering effect on the
strength of his presentation.

He states:

It does not follow, however, that any doctor is
generally and radically guilty of transgressing the
command of God, though he may expose himself to legal
penalty, if he thinks he should urge a socio-medical
indication". . . . For occasionally the command of
God may impose a judgement and action which go beyond
what is sanctioned by the law.18
Why Barth should be suddenly interested in the sociomedical indication in terms of human law is not clear. Of
course, God can order something that is against human law!
But why should He order a command that goes against His own
law?

Barth has just finished driving home the sinfulness of
4

abortion for any reason but the life of the mother. Why does
he now say that a socio-medical reason may be permissible?
Why didn't he say near the beginning, as he now says in this
small print, that the will of God is something we never fully
understand, but as a general rule we should permit abortion
only in the case of a threat to the mother's life?
this footnote I am left with a confused opinion.

With

I do not

know how convinced he is about abortion because I do not know
how often he thinks the doctors can urge abortion for a sociomedical indication.
Helmut Thielicke is more consistent than Barth in his
ethics on abortion.

He follows the same line of reasoning

about fetal value being dependent on the gift of God in his
book, The Ethics of Sex.
13
Ibid., p. 422, small print.
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In pregnancy it is not a question—as it is in the
case of contraception—whether a proffered gift can
be responsibly accepted, but rather whether an already
bestowed gift can be spurned, whether one dares to
brush aside the arm of God after this arm has already
been outstretched. (p. 227)19
We are in the realm of God's gifts and God's responsibility and God's judgement and concern.

Therefore we

look upon the fetus and abortion in the context of tragedy
and judgement upon the whole of society as well as on the
mother:
The judgement pronounced by the Christian message goes
beyond the conception of guilt implied by the penal
sentence in several respects:
1. In the sense that it radicalizes the law. The murder
does not begin with the active killing (Matt. 5:21ff), nor
in the killing of the embryo. It begins rather with the
renunciation of the embryo; for here Is a person who refuses
to say "Yes" to a gift bestowed by God and a responsibility imposed by him. (p. 227)
2. The legal concept of guilt transcended by the spiritual
conception that the divine judgement is more merciful than
the judgement of men. One sees the guilt of the individual
incorporated in a totality of guilt. He turns to others,
asking which of them dares to cast the first stone (John
3:7). The total guilt can include the socio-economic
situation and would imply a change in the social conditions
in this case. . . yet there is no discernable reason that
can justify social situations for abortions, including
overpopulation, (pp. 229,230)20
The worth of the fetus stems from the order of creation and
the order of redemption.

From the order of creation we have

the growth of the fetus as a miracle actualizing itself. From
Helmut Thielicke. The Ethics of Sex (New York: Harper
and Row Publishers, 1964). The numbers in brackets at end of
quoted paragraphs refer to the page numbers in the book.
20Ibid.
T, . .

the order of redemption we have the Christ buying him with
a price and bestowing upon him an "alien dignity."
This alien dignity expresses the fact that it is not
man's own worth—his value for producing "good works,"
his functional proficiency, his pragmatic utility—
that gives him his dignity, but rather what God has
"spent on him," the sacrificial love which God has invested in him (Deut. 7:7ff). . . - And this actualization of man's alien dignity which we have emphasized,
may well exist at that point where man is still a fetus
and has no Important pragmatic value or may even be regarded as a burdensome, disturbing "enemy" (unjust
aggressor), (p. 231)21He then compares the Reformation concept of the
orders of creation with that of Catholicism, showing that
his reasoning is not based on Catholic presuppositions.
The Catholic orders of creation presuppose that the Fall
represents only an accidental break in the structure of
order of creation. . . . One can almost pass over the
Fall. . . . Reformation doctrine says that other than
the order of marriage and family which are orders of
creation, the orders are orders for God to preserve the
fallen world. [As for abortion] . . . the conflict between life and life does not occur in the original order
of creation and therefore the order of creation cannot
provide an answer to the question—whose life, the
mother or the fetus's? (p. 236)
Thielicke claims that we cannot find the answer in tradition, but only in the Christ-centred conscience.
can

The mother

volunteer to sacrifice herself or she can ask for mercy

on the grounds of quantitative differences.
Caught in the agony of the Fall, we are left to make
decisions on this one possibility of abortion in which we
know we will sin no matter what we do.

How different this

explanation is from the confident-sounding casuistry of
Ibid.
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Catholic canon law in which direct abortion is worse than
both lives dying, simply because the former is against canon
law while the latter is not.

Thielicke says, "In either case

we cannot decide with strict theological clarity and whatever, we can decide only subject to forgiveness." (p. 245)
The freedom with respect to the medical indication
[life of mother] in pregnancy should be understood
as costly and not as cheap freedom. Only from this
point of view can the quantitative criterion enter
into consideration. And even there it enters only when
the elemental conflict between the life of the mother
and that of the unborn child permits—and not only permits, but then also demands—that a decision be made.22
(p. 247)
One who is even more fixed in his mind than Barth
or Thielicke is Dietrich Bonhoeffer'.
anathema under all circumstances.

Abortion to him is

"The question whether

the life of the mother or the life of the child is of greater
value can hardly be a matter for a human decision." '

He also

says that "in cases where it is an act of despair, performed
in circumstances of extreme human or economic destitution and
misery, the guilt may often lie rather with the community than
with the individual." ^

I suggest that if he is really con-

cerned with community responsibility, he should be just as
concerned that at least one of the two lives be prevented
from dying.
22
Ibid.
23
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Glasgow: Fontana
Library, 1963), p. 176.
24

Ibid., p. 176.
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Also included in our list of anti-abortionists is
the well-known American ethicist, Paul Ramsey.

From what I

have read of his writings, I see nothing new to add to the
ideas of the three Continental theologians we have just reviewed.

I do see, however, a different flavor.

Paul Ramsay

uses scriptural quotes more freely than the Continental
theologians and with them he creates the mood of compassion
and loving kindness that God has for man, a mood which implies
that the fetus must be very important to him also.
The value of human life is ultimately grounded in the
value God is placing on it. Man is sacredness in human
biological processes no less than his is a sacredness
in the human social or political order. That sacredness
consists not in its heart to anybody. What life is in
and of itself is most clearly to be seen in situations
of naked equality of one life with another, and in the
situation of congeneric helplessness which is the human
condition in the first of life. . . . It is best not to
concentrate on degrees of relative worth we may later
acquire, (p. 72)
The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you,
because you were already intrinsically more than a blob
of tissue in the uterus or greater in size than the period
at the end of this sentence; "but it is because the Lord
loves you, and is keeping the oath which he swore to your
fathers, that the Lord has brought you out with a mighty
hand. . . . " (Deut. 7:3) RSV
Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before
you were born I consecrated you. . . . (Jeremiah 1:5) RSV
0 God, You know me inside and out, through and through.
Your circumventing presence covers my every move

. ..

You were present at my very conception.
You guided the development of my unformed members within
the body of my mother. Nothing about me, from beginning
to end, was hid from Your eyes.
How frightfully and fantastically wonderful it all is!
--Psalm 139:1,5, 12b, 13, 14.
Good Lord, Where Are You?
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Thus, every human being is a unique unrepeatable opportunity to praise God. His life is entirely an ordination,
a loan, and a stewardship. His essence is his existence
before God and to God, as it is from Him. His dignity is
an "alien dignity," an evaluation that is not of him but
placed upon him by divine degree.... It is precisely
the little ones who have hardly any human claims who are
sought out and covered by his mercy. (p. 74)•
It is precisely when all reasonable natural grounds for
hope are gone that one needs hope and may hope in God,
even as when all hope was gone Abraham hoped on in
faith, (p. 75)25
In Graham Scott, a United Church minister, we see a
further use of scripture as a basis for theological expression.
The fact is that no where in the Bible can It be said conclusively that abortion is mentioned either in praise or
in condemnation. However, it may well be referred to in
four instances, namely, Galations 5:20 "idolatry, medicine
(sorcery), enmity . . ."; Revelation or Apocalypse 9:21
"nor did they repent of their murders or their medicines
(sorceries) or their immorality"; Revelation 21:3 ". . .
as for murders, fornicators, medicine-men (sorcerers),
idolators . . ."; and Revelation 22:15 "Outside are the
dogs and medicine-men (sorcerers) and fornicators and
murders. . . . " The Greek words that I have translated
medicine or medicine-men are related to our word "pharmacy"
and mean at root either poison or medicine. Now one of
the jobs of these medicine-men or sorcerers was the procuring of abortions. This is surely at least one of the
reasons and perhaps the main reason why this kind of
medicine-sorcery was condemned along with murder and
promiscuity by the texts. In any case, it is note-worthy
that the Didache, an important early second century manual
of Christian discipline, specifies: "thou shalt not use
magic; thou shalt not use medicine; thou shalt not procure
abortion, nor commit infanticide." (2.2)

25
^Passages quoted, except for Biblical references, are
from, Paul Ramsey, "The Morality of Abortion," Life or Death,
ed. by Daniel H. Lobley (Portland: University of Washington
Press, 1963). The numbers in brackets at end of quoted paragraphs refer to the page numbers in the book.
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Then Scott mentions scriptural references in which
fetuses seem to be affected by God's presence: Ps. 139:5-16,
Job 3:16, the Jeremiah reference (1:5), and the leaping of
the babe in Elizabeth's womb when Mary, pregnant with Jesus,
came to visit her.

Here, Elizabeth called Mary, "the mother

of my Lord" (Luke 1:43) which suggests that in the womb, Jesus
was truly the human-divine creature He was in later life.
On page 34 of the thesis I mentioned Exodus 21:22-25 as
the only explicit reference to abortion.

Scott suggests that

it not be taken as a proof text.
If all we had were the Old Testament, and of the Old
Testament all that we valued were the books of the Law,
then this text might be decisive. But Christians cannot
ignore the prophets and the psalms which bore witness to
Christ, nor can we ignore the distinction between God's
law and Moses' law which our Lord made on several occasions, notably in Matthew 19:8. When asked why Moses gave
a commandment to give a certificate of divorce to put one's
wife away, Jesus said, "For your hardness of heart Moses
allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning
it was not so." . . . Jesus laid down the moral truth;
Moses had not only to lay down truth but to legislate for
his society. Therefore, when we seek to learn from the
Old Testament, we must beware of mistaking human traditions for God's will.26
The question we immediately ask Is, "What grounds
have we to say that this Exodus text is a human tradition?"
unless we compare the whole passage on human violence from
which it Is taken, Exodus 25:12-27, with Jesus' words, in
Matthew 5:38-43, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye
All passages quoted under discussion of Scott are from
a mimeographed paper he wrote. Graham A. P. Scott, "A Paper
on the issue of Abortion and Bill C-195 in the Light of the
Bible and the Canadian Bill of Rights," 9 pp.
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for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'

But I say to you, Do

not resist one who is evil . . . turn to him the other
[cheek] . . . Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. . . . "

If we do this in proper logic we would

say that the person who causes the miscarriage of a woman
should be forgiven and left to God's judgement.

On the

other hand, we would be wrong in assuming that Jesus thought
abortion was alright.

He did not hammer away at the obvious

moral truths about killing life.

He usually started from the

obvious, the socially accepted, and went on from there. "Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and
Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven"
(Matt. 5:20).

It should be noted that abortion has never

been a serious problem for Jews until the last few centuries.
Jesus presumably did not speak about it because it was practiced so little, if at all, amongst his people.
C.

The Contextual Approach:

The Fetus As a Value Among

Values
Not all of the Christian positions on abortion focus
attention on the question, "Who has ultimate claim on the
fetus?"

Those who call themselves contextualists or situa-

tionalists would rather aim for the answer to another question
as their basic goal:

"In a given circumstance what values or

value should be given highest priority?". Now those referred
to in Part B are interested in weighing values too, but unlike
the contextualist, they assume that any given fetus must have
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the same basic right to live as any other given fetus, just
as a given person should have the same basic right to live
as another person.

That right to them maybe less than that

of a postnatal human but it is not any less than some other
fetus.

The contextualist does not see it this way.

He does

not assume that a given fetus should have the same basic
right to live as another fetus. Fetal value is not a constant for all fetuses.

Fetal value is a variable along with

other variables and every decision about abortion must be
carefully thought through as an individual case, even situations where the right decision appears obvious to the theologians in Part B.
There is an illustration of this in the writings of
Joseph Fletcher, a contextualist.

Fletcher says, "In most

situations birth control by prevention is better than
abortion,'

i.e. there may be a situation somewhere where

one would be better to forgo contraception and allow abortion instead.

To Fletcher, it is not obvious that preven-

tion of unwanted pregnancy is always better than abortion.
Now Ramsey, a non-contextualist, thinks that prevention is
always better than abortion, and demands an example that would
prove the exception.23
Despite their hesitance about working from principles
27
Fletcher, Situation Ethics, p. 122.
28
Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 220.
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in a prescriptive manner, some contextualists can be found to
uphold their own values as principles.

For instance, Joseph

Fletcher declares that the only rule in ethics should be the
rule of agape love. What agape dictates should be the determinant.

Otherwise, he affirms, the only rule is that there

is an exception to every rule.

Nevertheless, when speaking

about abortion he says at one point, "No unwanted or unintended baby should ever be born," which is as strong a rule
y
as any.29

John C. Bennett, another contextualist, at least
regarding abortion, claimed that he was "shocked" that Commonweal, a liberal Catholic journal, should uphold the traditional
Catholic dogma on abortion.
This invoking of one law or principle in isolation and
without regard to other human circumstances is a harsh
and unconvincing form of legalism.
But like Fletcher, he too, makes his own principles.
He would advocate legal abortion because of qualitative differences between mother and child, because of fetal abnormalities, and because of his belief that a strict law encourages women to go to dangerous illegal abortionists.
Actually, what Bennett wants is a law which will allow persons to choose abortion according to conscience, within the
boundaries he suggests.™
29
Fletcher, Situation Ethics, p. 39.
30
John C. Bennett, "Editorial," Christianity and Crisis,
XXVII (March 20, 1967). The quotes and references on Bennett
are in the two pages of the editorial, pp. 47-43.

52
The Board of Social Ministry of the Lutheran Church
in America (L.C.A.) has published a booklet containing the
views of two of its members, Frederick K. Wentz and Robert
H. Witmer, though their views are not the official position
of the church.

They follow a line of thinking similar to

Bennett's, i.e. abortion should be allowed within a framework
of certain points of stress.

"For the Christian conscience

the central question is, 'What is God's will at this point
of decision'?"

The authors believe that God's will can be

found best under a number of possibilities which they group
together under the heading of "compassionate abortion."

This

*

position, "takes seriously the rights of fetal life but gives
priority consideration to the needs and circumstances of the
pregnant woman, including her present family responsibilities."
There are four categories for compassionate abortion: medical,
eugenic, humanitarian (rape, incent, pregnancy under 15 years)
and socio-economic indications.

One could criticize these

categories as permissive, but the authors hope for some restraint through the counselling sessions which the mothers
have before being allowed abortion.

Despite this, abortion

appears to depend upon the subjective evaluation of mother
and counsellors rather than upon some agreed-upon standard.^
The late Raymond Hord, former secretary of the Board
^ Frederich K. Wentz and Robert H. Witmer, "The Problem
of Abortion," Studies in Man, Medicine and Theology (New
York: Board of Social Theology, Lutheran Church in America,
1967), pp. 21-24.
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of Evangelism of the United Church of Canada was mentioned
earlier in the discussion of United Church views.

He con-

tended that the fetus should be a matter of subjective
evaluation.

He explained:

The Christian ethic is not one of perfection but a contextual one where decisions are made in the light of all
the circumstances facing us in a given situation.
. . . Our United Church brief declares that the foetus
which has very simple beginnings has accruing value. . . .
We cannot equate the value of the foetus in its early
stages with the value of the foetus in its later stages
or with the born child. And if an abortion is required
it should be performed in the first months of pregnancy,
if at all possible.32
As stated earlier, this "accruing" value was that which
it had to the mother as it grew older.
Dr. Hord's thesis was also based upon some other factors—the generosity of nature in producing sperms and eggs,
and the fact that one of five abortions are spontaneous. If
nature aborts anyway, should we be concerned with the loss of
fetal life?

Dr. Victor A. McKusic, chief of medical genetics

at John Hopkins University cites different but even more
compelling statistics for this:
Of every 1,000 fertilized ova—female eggs fertilized by
the male sperm—25O never even become implanted in the
womb. They just get lost and float away.
Another 150 become loosened and lost shortly after implantation, before the woman even knows she is pregnant.
Another 100 are lost in spontaneous abortion some time
in pregnancy's first 20 weeks. This leaves only 500
that become babies. Ten are still-born. Ninety are
either born prematurely or possess birth defects or
^.
often both (though premature babies may be quite healthy).
Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-124, p. 62933
Victor A. McKusic, "Geneticists Hope to Curb Birthrate
of Defectives," Kitchener-Waterloo Record (August 15, 1963),
P- 30.

With only fifty per cent fertilized ova ever being
born, one could argue that humanity should have at least an
equal opportunity as blind and fickle nature to determine
which fertilized ova will be born. Moreover, if these
little creatures are made in God's image and we humans can
do so little to save them, at least in the early stages of
growth, should not God be more concerned in saving them?

If

God allows fifty per cent to die naturally, why should we be
so concerned with saving those we do not want?34
In 1970, three states, Hawaii, Maryland, and New York,
passed laws that provide for abortion as a matter between
doctor and patient.

The 2,000 delegate American Protestant

Hospital Association upheld the same position on the grounds
that "the integrity of the family unit and the institution
of marriage is jeopardized, if not destroyed, by unwanted
children."

The editorial staff of The Christian Century

also upheld this view. ^
-*^0n the other hand we could argue that the great loss
in previable humanity is a challenge to medicine no less important than the challenge of deadly disease. Indeed, because
Ihey are in God's image, medicine should attempt to prevent
fetal loss with the same vigour it has for preventing disease.
A "Save the Embryos Fund" would have as much justification as
a "Save the Children's Fund." By research we might not only
be able to save more fetuses but also able to provide means
for determining sex and other factors. Research is being
done for economic reasons on cows and ewes to reduce the rate
of failure in their pregnancies. Why should human fetuses be
of less concern in terms of pregnancy success?
01

Editorial, "Summit Conference on Abortion," The
Christian Century, LXXXVII (March 25, 1970), p. 343. The
quote from The American Protestant Hospital Association and
the statement of the editorial staff of The Christian Century
are both found here.
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In fairness, neither the American Protestant Hospital Association nor The Christian Century should be identified
as purely contextualist in thinking.

But these answers to the

abortion problem are clearly examples of contextual ethics,
where mother and doctor try to estimate the priorities of the
situation without recourse to public law.

CHAPTER

V

SOURCES FOR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
Now that we have seen the positions of churches and
individual theologians, we have the task of sorting out a
theological answer.

I suggest that we first try to esta-

blish the sources on which we can base an answer.
himself, is the prime source.
answer.
A.

God,

God's will is the right

The question is, where do we find it?

Scripture
Being of the Protestant tradition,it would be

normal for me to look for scriptural sources for direction.
I would agree with Graham Scott, however, that there is no
proof text.

The Exodus passage, if taken alone, implies

that the mother is of more value than the fetus, but it is
also true that the husband was master of both.

The Exodus

passage implies that human life is divided in terms of
worth in certain circumstances.

Since, as Christians, we

believe all are one in Christ, we should not feel obligated
to follow Old Testament Law where this status difference is
made.

Like Scott, too, I do not think that the references

to "medicines," "sorcerers," or "sorcerys" in the New Testament give us much security.

The sorcerer would be involved

in questionable practices other than abortion, and which ones
the passages refer to we cannot tell by the word "sorcerer" or
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"medicine-men.
If scripture is to be relied on, it must be by inference, by passages which tell of the value God has for the
fetus and by his general outlook on man.

In men like Barth,

Thielicke, and Ramsey, we have seen those passages of scripture which speak of God's relation to man in the womb.

These

passages are brief but mention that God speaks to the prenatal creature.

They say that something goes on or can go

on between Him and incipient life.
cares for the fetus.

They acknowledge that God

Other than that they say little.

With

them we have insufficient evidence for a strong statement.
If we look at the New Testament as a whole and see
what Jesus Christ means to man, we might find more evidence
by inference.

"God so loved the world that he gave his only

Son" (John 3-*l6).

This shows how much God cares for man. He

gave his best and when God gives his best, then he cares for
us infinitely.

But does this mean that he cares to the same

degree for the fetus?

Ramsey thinks it does:

It is precisely the little ones who have hardly any
human claims who are sought out and covered by his
mercy.1
When Jesus speaks about gathering Jerusalem around him as a
hen would gather her chicks, when he warns, "If any man would
cause these little ones to sin it were better that a milestone
were hung around his neck and he be thrown into the sea," we
have this same tenderness.

Young and old, all are the flock

Ramsey, Life or Death, p. 74-
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of the Good Shepherd.
We must then ask, would he differentiate between the
fetus unborn and the little ones who are born?
too, part of his flock?

If God so loved the world, would he

not also love those unborn "lambs"?
the answer is "yes."

Are fetuses

By inference I believe

The one who, in Christ, refuses to

differentiate between men, women and children, would carry
this attitude through to the unborn child.

The Christ who

died for you and me has died also for those who are in the
womb.
Does this mean that we have no right to commit abor4

tion?

The answer to this comes from the New Testament doc-

trine of man's relation to man.
inference.

Here again we must work by

Jesus is not only God's Son, he is our brother,

and as our brother, through faith, God adopts us as his sons.
As adopted sons we are to be brothers and neighbours to one
another in him.

"When you have done it unto the least of

these my brethern, you have done it unto me." The prenatal
infant could be interpreted as one of the least of Jesus'
brethren.

The infant's blindness and immaturity would then

be no barrier to our being neighbour to him. We would have
a duty as Christians to bring him into this world and give
him the necessities of life.

The fact that he is illigitimate

or deformed or undesired would not detract from God's concern
for him and from his command to be neighbours to him.

It would

also mean that we should be neighbour to those who suffer from
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the unwanted pregnancy.

Caught in the guilt of premarital

"accident," or coming at a time when the mother is in physical or mental stress, our answer would be to act out what it
means to be neighbour to both creatures. With compassion
parallel to that which God had in sending his Son, we would
try to help the mother bear her suffering.

If secrecy or

financial help are needed we would provide agencies of concrete help.

If she were psychologically disturbed, we would

treat her lovingly as a psychologically disturbed person. Because drug therapy is dangerous to the fetus we would probably
try other means and help her to accept her child as a precious
little person.

If her life were threatened, we might abort

her so that at least one life could survive.

This one case

for abortion would be as a last resort, after all medical
direction pointed towards its necessity to preserve the life
of the mother, after God had been asked to intervene where
humanity could not help.

If the baby were the result of rape,

incest, adultery, or fornication and the mother and father
were guilt-ridden (it is not necessarily the case!) we would
treat them as anyone else like this.

Since the fetus was not

the evil we would not try to solve the dilemma by getting rid
of it.
Scripture does not give us clear direction about unwanted pregnancy.

But it does give a clear picture of God's

grace, his power to overcome all things in those who would
trust in Him.

It commands us to have reverence for human

life.

While all pregnancies demand a sacrifice of the mother,

and the unwanted pregnancy makes it more difficult to bear,
the commandment of God to be neighbour to those in need
carries with it the promise of comfort and aid.
Furthermore, there is the promise of forgiveness in
the Cross.

He bore our grief, our pain, our sin, and over-

came them so that he might reconcile us all to Himself, no
matter what our trouble.

In' the sin of promiscuous sex, in

the vicissitudes of sexual life in and out of marriage, accident and innocence, passion and selfishness, combine sometimes to produce unwanted pregnancies, prenatal life for whom
Christ died.

Most wanted children too are not the result of

planning, but the result of an "accident." Most wanted
children are unwanted sometime during the pregnancy. Most
women with undesirable pregnancies learn to love the child
when it becomes a baby in her arms.
proverb has it:

As the old Russian

"Two small hands upon the breast, and labour

is forgotten."
The agony of pregnancy is with nearly every woman,
in morning sickness, bleeding, fatigue.

Its being unwanted

adds to the burden and may make it look more evil than it is.
But, says scripture, all of these can be born in God's grace
and-human comfort.

Scripture commands us to be uncondemning

and helpful, acting as though sin has already been forgiven—
in our hearts, at least—looking upon the person as one in
need.
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Scripture offers no proof-text, but it offers a sound
outlook for the Christian.

It values human life as precious

in God's eyes rather than expendable because of primitiveness
or weakness; it suggests that we be neighbours to both parties
within the context of God's victory over suffering, rather
than hand-wringing judges between distressed parties; it
offers forgiveness instead of leniency, and it points to confidence in God's love for the weak rather than despair over the
immensity of the problem.

Finally, it does not say, but it

implies that the solution to the unwanted pregnancy lies in
other directions—in prevention by responsible sex and support
for those who are pregnant.
B.

Natural Law
Because we find in scripture only inferences about

abortion, we are forced to look beyond it for help in our
problem.

Because the fetus is a "constant" for the purpose

of our ethical discussion, perhaps the problem is one of
weighing other factors or "variables" in relation to it.
It would be wonderful if we could simply apply a given value
to this constant and then merely relate the other values in
categories and so devise a set of straightforward moral prescriptions.

Unfortunately it is not that easy.

The problem cannot be solved as a mathematical one,
but it can be viewed in functional terms. In our survey of
Christian and non-Christian attitudes, we have seen the value
of the fetus in terms of the mother's life, health, etc,
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according to the values given it by mother, society, God,
etc.

This type of thinking can be called natural law

thinking.

It hopes to reach universal norms, or, more

accurately, it thinks from ideas that it already believes
are universal norms.
One does not have to be a Roman Catholic to apply
the principle of natural law.

In Karl Barth we can see the

"natural law" principle at work.

While Barth takes great

pains in his Church Dogmatics to prove that scripture must
corroborate theological thinking, he does not use scripture
to corroborate the main axiom of
that the fetus is human.

his position on abortion—

He just states that this is so and

then uses scripture to prove how much God cares for the fetus.
In his own mind he creates a universal norm, the axiom that
the fetus is human.
The other Continental theologians and Ramsey and
Scott all do the same.

Just as the Criminal Code of Canada

defines what is human for its purposes (page

of the thesis)

so do these theologians state what is human for their purposes.
If we look upon the problem as one of finding a universal norm for treatment of the fetus, we go a long way in
solving the problem of abortion, particularly as a legal
problem.

For once we have established a universal norm,

then we can make laws in terms of it.
I have stated that scripture suggests by inference
that the fetus is very valuable in the eyes of God.

I did
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not say that scripture says it is
enough.

human or prehuman, or human

I meant that it was so valuable to God that we should

avoid aborting it unless the mother's life was at stake or
likely to be endangered.
norm.

This, I suggest to be a universal

It is theological; it avoids the humanity question;

it points to solutions which edify all persons concerned; it
allows God to have His sovereignty over all prenatal life and
to play an important role in its solution; it assumes rightfully that God is Lord of the state which will make the laws on
abortion.
C.

Contextual Ethics
Contextual or situational thinking is the only type of

theological thinking I have found that gives an alternative
to the "natural law" approach to abortion.
To a certain extent the contextualists take seriously
the New Testament position of being neighbour to one's fellow
man.

They press for loving one's neighbour in a community

context.

Because our community or society is pluralistic

they sympathize with the desire to let persons decide abortion
from their own conscience and not from some external authority
such as the church or the state unless they wish to do so.
They have a great deal of sympathy for the woman with an unwanted pregnancy and tend to accuse her background, her
ignorance of.sex, harsh conditions in family and economic life,
more than they accuse her.

They abhor the back-alley abortion-

ist and the abortion-mill, and strive for clinical settings
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with proper maternal care. When she comes for pastoral
counselling, the mother is allowed to make up her mind
after being shown the alternatives, and, for the most part
allowed to have the abortion if she wishes. In short, there
is a strong desire to ease her pain and relieve her stress
so that she can return to normal activities.
But they also let the value of the pregnancy be a
matter of private judgement, in effect, a matter of personal expediency.

In this way, they do a poor job in pro-

tecting the life of the other neighbour, the fetus. Their
neighbourliness is only partial.
Furthermore, they speak with little reference to
Christian tradition.

They neglect the historical Christian

community and its doctrine.

They do not emerge from it with

new ideas, but speak new ideas in semi-isolation.

For this

reason, I hesitate to endorse the present prescriptions for
abortion laws suggested by the contextualists as serious
presentations.

I believe that theologians should prescribe

only theological answers to theological problems such as abortion when they can give sound presentations from within the
theological community.

In my view the contextual presenta-

tions I have read lack sound roots.
Of course, the abortion problem is difficult for theology because of uncertainties about prenatal life. We can
best infer conclusions from our doctrines of man after birth.
Therefore, we should not expect an airtight position from the
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contextualists, only a better developed position than has been
shown so far.
In looking for a strategy for contextual ethics,
Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., advocates "an even more contextual
contextualism":
Are not certain matters most helpfully and simply handled
by laws; others by principles; and still others by the
situational approach? If so, then we should call for an
even more contextual contextualism, one that refuses to
be bound by the "in-principled rejection" of any particular way of formulating or applying Christian norms. Such
a flexible, or non-ideological, contextualism would not
claim that it alone has the valid contributions of any
Christian ethic which bears fruit in neighbour love. If
the fruit can be borne by a mature reliance upon rules,
modified as necessary by casuistries, let it be respected.
If the fruit comes from an idealistic or teleological ethic
which handles these matters in terms of basic principles
and their application, why cast it away? If the situation
requires a contextual response to deal maturely with the
contingent and unusual circumstances being encountered, let
that be embraced in the freedom of the Gospel without requiring that the resultant way of dealing with the issue
become paradigmatic for all Christian living!2
Some time in the future the contextual approach may
produce a better approach to the ethics of abortion than an
approach that starts out with establishing principles. I
suspect, however, that because of the nature of the abortion
problem, contextualism would play a more
a counselling device.

appropriate role as

The military divides its fighting

roles into two main areas—strategy and tactics.

Strategy is

the development of an overall plan for action; tactics are
the means to be used at the local level in order to work out

York:

Edward Long, Jr., A Survey of Christian Ethics (New
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 312.

66
the strategy.

To solve abortion problems we need strategy

based on principles, and we need tactics based from analysis
of the specific situation.

Contextual ethics is suited for

tactics but not for strategy and we should not depend on it
alone or primarily in order to solve our problems in abortion.

CHAPTER VI
TOWARDS AN ABORTION LAW
A.

Every Law Has Theological Implications
It has been argued that since we live in a pluralis-

tic society, laws should be framed which allow freedom for
the expression of all theologies and ideologies.

John Turner,

the Canadian Minister of Justice, spoke in this vein when he
introduced into the House of Commons the Criminal Law Amendment Bill (1963-69) which contained ,our present abortion law
in Canada.
Our response to this bill will depend upon our tolerance
and our understanding of the needs of a pluralistic
society, a society in which everyone must strive to reconcile his opinion and personal beliefs.1
It must be understood though, that since abortion has
theological implications—the right to destroy prenatal life,
and the value of that life—that any law will at least imply
a theological position.

Therefore, if one tries to "recon-

cile his opinions and personal beliefs" the answer he arrives
at will be just as theological as the one he has forsaken.
For instance, if one argues that there should be no law at all
regarding abortion, one implies that the question of whether
to destroy or preserve a given prenatal life is purely a matter of expediency and the value of that life is estimated only
Canada, Parliament, Hansard (House of Commons) 19631969, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament, second reading of Criminal
Law Amendment Bill, p. 4713.
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in terms of what it means to the others involved.

If one

says that the law should concern itself only with serious
threats to the physical health of the mother and should
otherwise preserve the fetus, then one places a much higher
value on the unborn child.

The second answer should not be

regarded as more "theological" than the first.
No matter what we say or do not say about abortion,
we make theological assumptions. And no matter how liberal
or open-minded we try to be we inevitably make restrictive,
not permissive theological statements.

Suppose we choose

to leave the question of abortion to private conscience.
Ostensibly we would be letting everybody have his way.

But

really we would be denying the wishes of all those who want
abortion as a matter of public conscience embodied in law.
There are those who think of abortion as a matter of private
morality, and those who think of it as a matter of public
morality.

There are those who think of God as Lord over the

law, and those who would keep Him out.

These positions are

more a matter of transforming opinion by sound and right
reasoning than reconciling it.
As Christians, we have a duty to make our contribution
to the public discussion.

We go wrong only if we present bad

theology, not Christian theology, and if we, like anyone else,
fail to understand the reasons for the agony about this problem.

We must aim for a good law, based as closely as pos-

sible on the will of God.
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B.

One's Position on Abortion Influences the Rights of
Postnatal Life
Secondly, the position one takes on abortion

strengthens or weakens his argument for the sanctity of
postnatal life. If one holds that abortion should be
permitted only to protect the life of the mother, one
implies that prenatal life is precious, and if prenatal life
is precious then postnatal life must be precious too.

On the

other hand, by postulating permissive abortion one implies
that prenatal life has little inherent value and only by
technical distinction, with no basis in biology, can one
still hold that postnatal life is very precious. As Ralph
B. Potter says:
When a fetus is aborted no one asks for whom the bell
tolls. No bell is tolled. But do not feel indifferent and secure. The fetus symbolizes you and me and
our tenuous hold upon a future here at the mercy of
our fellow men.2
It is bad law to try to uphold postnatal human life
as inviolable while affording little or no protection to
prenatal life.

If we do, we live a lie unto ourselves, we mo

our laws based on human rights, for we know that the difference between a life born and a life unborn can be as little
as the difference in circulatory systems. We know that there
is continuity of growth from conception to birth, just as
there is a continuity of growth from birth to maturity.

We

know that fetal life is primitive, helpless, and dependent,
2
Potter, Religious Situation, p. 157.
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but we also know that babies are totally dependent on parents,
and most children are largely dependent

on others until six-

teen years of age or more. We know that communication between
the fetus and mother is very primitive, but we also know that
babies are at least a year old before being able to talk. We
know that "God-talk" is useless until a child has grasped
the meaning of parental love in terms of language, yet we
also believe in child baptism where God does something for
the child because he is not limited by verbal language. All
signs of humanity point to a continuity between prenatal and
postnatal life. Why, then, should there be a sudden difference
in regard for prenatal life?

Because we cannot see the pain

or torn limbs or hear any cries?
good an answer as any.

Yes, I think that is as

No one tolls the bell for the fetus

because the operation in a hospital is done under anaesthetic
and medical personnel are trained to do the job impassively.
The fetal remains are put in a paper bag and placed in the
garbage.

The doctor washes up and the mother is wheeled into

the recovery room.

Is it murder?

it is, some will sayv

Not unless the law says

But what greater right have we to live

than that unwanted fetus?

Why should one's being wanted ever

have anything to do with the privilege of being born?

Who

says that the state has the ultimate authority over life and
death?

Who gave this right, if not God?

And why does Canada

pass a law for the abolition of capital punishment and yet
pass another law which allows abortion in cases where a woman's
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health is only likely to be endangered; i.e., why is a murderer's
life more sacred than a fetal life?
C.

Pluralism without Permissiveness
Traditionally, the Christian has claimed that God is

Lord over the state.

In days of Christendom this was easy to

apply to issues such as abortion.

In our present religiously

heterogeneous era it is objected to by many.

Nevertheless

the objections can not usurp God from His rightful place and
Christians should not feel compelled to give into those who
raise objections.

We should shamelessly announce that we

believe.
For various reasons, perhaps as outlined by Ralph
Potter, Jr., earlier in the thesis, the general public attitude has been moving toward a relaxation of abortion laws.
It is the people's attitude, not the inherent value of the
fetus or a worsening of the suffering of pregnant women that
has been changing.

I believe that those who press for more

liberal therapeutic abortion laws have let the horror of
suffering distort their perspective so that they erroneously
value the mother's health, or even conscience, over the life
of the unborn child, thus placing priority in the wrong place.
Furthermore, instead of seeking to relieve the conditions
which promote abortion, they would liberalize the law so that
inadvertently society becomes abortifacient
abortion preventative.

rather than

Liberalized laws always lead to in-
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creased legal abortions without eliminating illegal abortions.-'
The cost in hospital beds, maternal care, and the caustic attitude to prenatal life all go up.

And meanwhile, we approach

a few steps closer to the human degradation of a Brave New
World.
People know intellectually that what is legal is not
necessarily moral, but in practice may tend to be only as
moral as the law demands, especially when under stress. What
the law permits does have an effect on what we do. A law on
abortion has its own educative value.

It has a greater effect

if the reasons given are sound and they are explained.

If, for

instance, we permit abortion on a restricted basis only, and
say that this is because the fetus is valuable, we say that
persons in general are valuable, and the law will play a role
in helping persons to revere all human life. All persons concerned are affected in their attitudes by the law and in the
course of decision look to it for guidance.
D.

Abortion to Protect the Life of the Mother
I would recommend that abortion should be legally per-

mitted only in the case where a woman's life is threatened by
the pregnancy.

This could be interpreted to include instances

where her health is endangered to the extent that she might
die.

The value of the fetus is no greater than that of the

-'For example, in Czechoslovakia with permissive laws
there were 142 known illegal abortions in 1963; 49 in 1964,
and 70 in I965. Those figures compare with 70,546 legal
abortions in 1963, 70,693 in 1964 and 79,591 in 1965. Bill
C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36, p. 370.
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mother and she should be permitted abortion when she is
threatened by such grave circumstances.
Abortion only on the grounds of threat to the mother's
life would be a strict law.

It would admittedly cause some

women to seek out illegal abortionists.

It would raise the

cry of "cruelty!" by liberal reformers.

It would cause

grouchy reaction from those who want their freedom to decide.
Many doctors would ignore it. A "reactionary" law as proposed
here is out of step with the public mood.

In fact, the

Minister of Justice has been quoted at the time of this writing
as saying that there is no "imminent" proposal to have the
abortion laws changed, as though there is such a possibility
in the future. With the repeal of abortion laws in three of
the United States, liberal reformers in Canada have received
added momentum for either liberal interpretations of our present
law, or repeal of it on the same grounds. Ironically, it may
be the proximity of New York State that could alleviate the
pressure, by Canadian women making use of its facilities instead of pressuring for reform here. Whatever the case, the
position of this paper is as popular as an attack on "motherhood" (pun intended).
Nevertheless, a study of the experience of abortifacient countries reveals the high price paid for such
freedom.

If morality will not bring a return to stricter law,

the cost of increased gynacological problems and premature
births may cause enough abhorrence to reverse the present
climate.

74
Dr. Alan Guttmacher, president of the Planned Parenthood-World Population Association, speaks about creating
"abortoriums" for the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 New York
City women wanting abortion each year under the new law.
How soothing is his statement, "An abortion is one of the
simplest and safest of all operations—safer than a routine
tonsilectomy," before the New York law has come into effect.4
But do we hear such words from Britain after its laws have
been in force for two years?

Or in the Soviet bloc nations,

or in Japan after years of permissiveness?

In Britain there

is alarm about the health of women who have undergone abortion
because of poor sanitary facilities and short convalescence.
The doctors who run the clinics get rich quickly and are suspected of caring more for the money than for the patients. In
the Soviet bloc nations, Bulgaria and Rumania have made noteworthy restrictions on former permissive laws; and Andras
Klinger of the Hungarian Central Office of Statistics reports on the effects of abortion in the European socialist
countries:

"Its deleterious effect on health is sufficient

reason to change the present day situation."5

In the same

vein, Japanese women members of the Diet have complained about
the damage to the health of Japanese women because of wide^Globe and Mail (April 11, 1970).
^Bills C-122, C-123, C-136, p. 675- See page 27 for
restrictions on Rumanian and Bulgarian abortion laws.
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open abortion laws.
It may be that Canada will have to go all the way
and repeal its abortion laws completely before there is a
return to stricter ones.

In the present climate, this

thesis is too late to affect the laws passed in 1969, and
most likely too early to receive much attention for conservative reform.

In the meantime, I hope that it may be

used as part of the evidence that is necessary for more
comprehensive and deeper understandings of abortion and
its related problems.
I heard this from a Catholic priest home on furlough
from Japan.

CONCLUSION
This study has been an attempt to find legal terms
for abortion based upon sound theology.

Near the beginning

I pointed out how the formulation of any law on abortion is
dependent upon theological suppositions

involved in the

value of the fetus and the right to abort it. We found in
the course of study that there were two main channels of
Christian and logical thinking:

thinking based on the an-

swer to the question, "Who has ultimate claim upon the fetus?"
and thinking based on the answer to the question, "In a given
situation which values should receive priority?". In actual
fact, we found that apparent conflict was solved if we used
the first question as a basis for "strategic" thinking and
the second question for "tactical" thinking.

We found that

the first question helped us establish principles by which to
formulate a law and the second helped us find the answer for
a specific situation from the "context" (hence, contextual
ethics) of these principles and other factors.

The conflict

came only when some theologians, such as Fletcher and Bennett
tried to deny the validity of principles which they did not
like, while wanting to create some of their own.
In formulating the law that I have suggested, we can
see both of these questions being answered, not mutually exclusive of one another, but in harmony with one another. In
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answering the question about ultimate claim upon the fetus,
I suggested by inference from scripture that God alone has
ultimate claim on the fetus, and that since He considers
the incipient life very valuable, then so should we. In
answering the second question about values receiving
priority, again by inference from scripture I suggested that
we look to the question, "What does it mean to be neighbour?";
the values which come from this should give us the basis for
the particular situation.
This results in the conclusion that the removal of the
fetus from the mother should take place only when both can
survive, which, of course, is not abortion.
neighbour to the fetus by aborting him.

One cannot be

If, however, due to

some medical problem of the mother the pregnancy acts as a
threat to her life, then she should be allowed to have it
aborted, for in this case we are better to be neighbour to one
of the two lives than let both of them die.
The law, then, should permit abortion where there is
a serious threat to the life of the mother by the pregnancy.
Our discussion ended with this proposition.

The

law will never be vindicated, however, unless it is accompanied by reforms in related areas.

There must be an al-

leviation of the desire for abortion.
three necessary preconditions:

To this end I can see

a growing reverence for pre-

natal life, means for preventing pregnancy except when a
child is wanted, and financial as well as counselling help
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for women distressed by unwanted pregnancies.
The first of these means a change in human attitudes.
It is the most basic, because, I suggest, most abortions take
place primarily as a result of moral indifference to the fetus.
Karl Barth has said:

"The only thing which can help is the

power of a wholly new and radical feeling of awe at the mystery
of all human life as this is commanded by God as its Creator,
Giver and Lord."1

Ralph Potter, Jr., maintains that words

are not enough to achieve this.

Deeds, too, are needed.

It is best conveyed by demonstrating respect for life in
all its forms through the courage of an institution or
an individual to sacrifice wealth and prestige and station
in defense of the poor, the aged, the outcast in the
ghetto, and the victims of war. Churchmen and theologians must exhibit in their relations with men the same
sacrifice of self in love which they have required of
mothers menaced by their own offspring.2
Yet, at a time when persons are determined to have as
few limits as possible, contraceptive means to prevent unwanted pregnancies are necessary.

Too often these days contra-

ceptives fail or are not used properly and pregnancy results,
and since the couple thought they were being careful and responsible, they blame the pregnancy on the failure of the contraceptive and feel justified in having an abortion.

It is

ironical that in promising freedom from unwanted pregnancy,
the Pill has apparently helped to create a more permissive
climate for abortion.

The ideal, I suggest, would be a long

term contraceptive for men, lasting from the onset of puberty
Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 4, P- 4172
Potter, J., Religious Situation, 1963, p. 157-
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until the time for the fathering of children in marriage.
Following the birth of the desired number of children, the
same long-range contraceptive could be used.

Until such

a drug or device is invented, voluntary sterilization of
either the mother or father after the birth of the last
desired child would at least reduce unwanted pregnancies
in family situations.
The third precondition is becoming more popular. In
Denmark there are Mother's Aid Centres to help women distressed
with undesired pregnancies.

In Sweden there are similar

counselling centres. And, since 1968, there has been Birthright in North America, "where help is as near as the telephone."

Unless we can offer a woman help to carry her

pregnancy to term and provide satisfactory answers regarding
the placing of the child afterwards, she may be too depressed
to carry on with the pregnancy.
Finally, without getting engrossed in aspects of the
problem beyond the range of this paper, I must briefly suggest some other areas of study.

As a theological problem,

abortion should not be considered an isolated issue. It is
one of several related issues that raise questions about the
value of individual human life; issues like euthenasia, capital
punishment, population control, feticide, battered babies,
killing in war, .genetical engineering, organ transplants,
test-tube babies, asexual human reproduction from human tissue cultures, and the manipulation of the human mind and other
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parts of the body by drugs. In other words, abortion is only
one of several issues that raise questions about man*a
theological justification for manipulating or destroying himself. It would be appropriate for theology to undertake
study on these issues to that the conclusions reached on any
one are consistent with those reached on the others; i.e.
a theology of life under whose umbrella all of these issues
might fit.

APPENDIX
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FETAL HUMANITY AND ITS SANCTITY
In traditional theology it was accepted that when one
became a human one should be accorded the rights of humanity.
In theological circles the discussion centred around the time
at which this took place.

Below is an outline of the principle

factors in ancient times and the meaning that modern genetics
brings to the picture.

The outline is a digest of the des-

cription given by Paul Ramsey in his speech, "The Morality of
Abortion" printed in the book Life or Death, by Daniel H.
Lobby.
Creationism:-

This is the ancient theological be-

lief that the unique individual soul comes by process of
humanization or socialization in interaction with persons
around him.

He is "created," "infused" into the already

existing organism.

Those who say that the child becomes

human only after he is a personal object or exercises
reasons, express the same idea (cf. Buss).
Traducianism:-

This is the opposite to Creationism.

It is the belief that humanity takes place at conception.
The individual is whoever he is going to be from the moment
of conception, drawn forth from his parents.

To explain

identical twins, who are the result of a cleavage of the
blastocyst, the cluster of cells formed from the original
31
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fertilized ovum, one has to compromise with creationism because the unique individuality obviously occurs at a time
later than conception.
Animation:- In the prenatal development "animation"
is the point between conception and birth that is usually
taken to be crucial.

There are two answers:

1. The moment

fetal life becomes an independent source of movement in the
womb (it "quickens"); 2. the idea from the word anima (soul)
that the soul is the form of the body.
fetus humanus "= fetus formatus.

Thus fetus animatus ==

This view entails the belief

that a living human fetus exists much earlier than either discernible motion or discernible human shape.

In theoretical

speculation there has never been a certain or unanimous
opinion among theologians to the effect that a fetus humanus
or fetus animatus begins at the very moment of conception.
There has always been a lapse assumed between conception and
animation.
Older theologians distinguished between a formed
fetus and a quickened fetus, and nutritive,animal and intellectual parts of the soul.

But they did not go so far as to

say that all this was created and infused at impregnation.
Modern Genetics:- Modern genetics teaches that there
are "formal causes," imminent principles, or constitutive
elements long before there is any shape or motion or discernible size.

Now it can be asserted "scientifically" that who

one is, and is to be, is present from the moment of conception.

One may allow this does not necessarily imply that human
rights should begin at conception.

But one would have to

provide himself with some account (perhaps drawn from these
ancient accounts) of how by stages or degrees a human offspring approaches sacredness.
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